Wei fenghe biography sample

Former defense ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu have been expelled from the Communist Party of China and stripped of their qualification as delegates to the 20th CPC National Congress.

These decisions were reviewed and approved at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held on Thursday, according to statements issued after the meeting.

Due to their serious violations of discipline and laws, Li and Wei were placed under investigation in August and September last year, respectively, following clues uncovered during cases handled by the Discipline Inspection Commission of the Central Military Commission.

According to the statements, both Li and Wei seriously violated political and organizational discipline, and resisted organizational scrutiny.

An investigation has found that Li, who served as defense minister from March to October 2023, seriously breached political and organizational discipline.

After him are Gray Davis, Michael C. Burgess, Ludvig Holstein-Ledreborg, Zoran Zaev, José María Orellana, and Leyla Yunus.

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Among people born in 1954, Wei Fenghe ranks 373.

Concurrently, defense allocations under State Council purview grew by 7.1% in 2022 to 1.45 trillion yuan, reflecting sustained emphasis on military readiness amid advisory inputs from defense leadership.^[35]

International Engagements and Diplomatic Activities

Bilateral Meetings and Defense Diplomacy

During his tenure as Minister of NationalDefense from 2018 to 2023, Wei Fenghe conducted extensive bilateral engagements to advance China's military diplomacy, focusing on risk reduction mechanisms, joint exercises, and strategic partnerships.

His actions failed the trust of the CPC Central Committee and the CMC, and severely contaminated the political environment of the equipment sector in the military and the ethics of relevant industries.

Wei, Li's predecessor, who was the defense minister from 2018 to March 2023, was found to have severely breached political and organizational discipline by helping others gain improper benefits in personnel arrangements.

Wei also accepted gifts and money in violation of regulations, exploited his position to benefit others and accepted large sums of money, and is suspected of taking bribes.

As a high-ranking official of the Party and the military, Wei lost his faith and loyalty, the Xinhua report said, noting that his actions failed the trust of the CPC Central Committee and the CMC, and severely tainted the political environment of the military.

These two former defense ministers brought enormous damage to the Party's cause, the development of national defense and the armed forces, and the image of senior officials.

21, 2023.

According to the investigation results, Wei seriously violated political and organizational discipline by helping others gain improper benefits in personnel arrangements. After him are He Guoqiang (1943), Hui Liangyu (1944), Li Shangfu (1958), Qiao Guanhua (1913), Sun Chunlan (1950), and Hu Chunhua (1963).

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Wei Fenghe (魏凤和; born 1954) is a former general of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) who served as State Councilor and Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of China from March 2018 until his dismissal in January 2023.^[1] He joined the PLA at age 16 and rose through the ranks of the Second Artillery Corps, later reorganized as the PLA Rocket Force, commanding it from 2012 to 2017 and overseeing advancements in China's missile and nuclear capabilities.^[2] In June 2024, the Communist Party of China (CPC) expelled him from the party, citing serious violations of political and organizational discipline, including accepting bribes, seeking benefits for others in exchange for military postings, and failing to report family assets, as part of a broader anti-corruption campaign targeting senior military officials.^[3][4]Wei Fenghe's career exemplified the PLA's emphasis on technical expertise in strategic forces, with his tenure as Rocket Force commander focusing on enhancing deterrence through conventional and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.^[2] As defense minister, he represented China at international forums, advocating for military cooperation while asserting territorial claims in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, amid escalating tensions with the United States and regional neighbors.^[5] His downfall, alongside that of successor Li Shangfu, highlighted internal purges under Xi Jinping, where official announcements emphasized "disloyalty" in Wei's case, fueling speculation about deeper issues like graft undermining military readiness or factional struggles within the CPC.^[6][7]

Early Life and Education

Background and Military Entry

Wei Fenghe was born in February 1954 in Chiping County, Liaocheng, Shandong Province, a rural area in eastern China, during the height of Mao Zedong's leadership and the ongoing Great Leap Forward's aftermath, which shaped a generation amid economic hardship and ideological fervor.^[8][2] His early years coincided with the launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, a period of mass mobilization that emphasized proletarian values, anti-intellectualism, and youth involvement in revolutionary activities, fostering an environment where rural enlistment in the military was promoted as a path to personal and national redemption.^[9]In December 1970, at age 16, Wei enlisted in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), joining the Second Artillery Corps—the strategic missile force established in 1966 as a nuclear deterrent arm—as part of widespread recruitment campaigns during the Cultural Revolution that targeted young rural recruits to bolster defenses against perceived imperialist threats.^[9][10] These drives, driven by Maoist calls for "people's war" preparedness, drew tens of thousands of teenagers into service, often with minimal formal education, prioritizing loyalty and basic technical aptitude over advanced qualifications.^[11]Wei received initial technical training in rocket engineering at a specialized missile school affiliated with the Second Artillery Corps, where instruction focused on hands-on skills in missile assembly, maintenance, and rudimentary guidance systems, reflecting the era's reliance on Soviet-derived designs adapted through domestic reverse-engineering due to international embargoes.^[11][10] This entry-level role as a technician laid the groundwork for his specialization in strategic weaponry, amid the Corps' emphasis on self-sufficient innovation to achieve nuclear parity.

In July 2019, he publicly affirmed that the country was accelerating these efforts to bolster defense innovation, including in areas like advanced weaponry development. In June 2018, he hosted James Mattis in Beijing, where they discussed sustaining military-to-military dialogue and managing differences constructively, including on freedom of navigation operations.

By the mid-1990s, Wei had advanced to mid-level command positions overseeing unit relocations and upgrades from aging Soviet-era liquid-fueled systems to more mobile, survivable solid-fueled variants like the DF-31intercontinental ballistic missile under development.^[14]Following the redesignation of the Second Artillery Corps as the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force in December 2015, Wei's prior operational experience informed ongoing enhancements in missile readiness, though his mid-career roles emphasized tactical execution over strategic oversight.^[15]

Rise to Command Positions

Wei Fenghe advanced to senior leadership roles within the Second Artillery Corps during the 2000s through a series of promotions reflecting his technical expertise in missile operations.

In September 2023, Wei was investigated by the CMC's disciplinary inspection department for charges of corruption. This aligned with national policies under the State Council, where he contributed to frameworks enabling PLA oversight of relevant civilian R&D outputs, though specific attributions of policy outcomes remain tied to collective leadership decisions rather than individual actions.Wei influenced the incorporation of PLA assets into civilian emergency response protocols during the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak, where military units provided logistical support such as medical personnel deployment and supply transport to Wuhan via coordinated rail and air operations.^[33][34] These efforts adhered to doctrines preserving civilian authority primacy, with the PLA acting in a supplementary capacity to enhance national resilience without supplanting State Council-led coordination.

Before him are Keith Campbell, Oscar Larrauri, Rick Warren, K. Chandrashekar Rao, Mustafa Barghouti, and Aavo Pikkuus. Further talks occurred in October 2018 at the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting in Singapore and November 2018 in Washington during the U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, reaffirming commitments to crisis communication channels.^[37][38] With Lloyd Austin in 2022, meetings at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus in November covered de-escalation protocols for Taiwan Strait activities, with both sides agreeing to maintain open lines despite disagreements over U.S.

transits and arms sales. In June 2024, he was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and his case transferred to the military judiciary for criminal prosecution, and his rank of General in the Rocket Force revoked. From 2018 to 2023, he was the Minister of National Defense, the first to have not come from the PLA Ground Forces and the first-ranked State Councilor from March 2018 to March 2023, and also the first-ranked ordinary Member of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

^[39]In a keynote at the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue, Wei asserted China's sovereignty over South China Sea features, referencing its historical rights and interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, while pledging defensive actions against external interference and inviting verification of island-building activities.^[40] This address highlighted China's preference for bilateral negotiations over multilateral arbitration in territorial disputes.Wei deepened defense ties with Russia through agreements on joint maneuvers.

These measures sought to align military spending with modernization priorities, though specific quantitative reductions in waste were not publicly detailed in contemporaneous disclosures.^[27][28]

Roles in Higher CCP Structures

Central Military Commission Membership

Wei Fenghe served as a member of the Communist Party of China's Central Military Commission (CMC) from October 2017 to June 2023, following his election to the 19th Central Committee at the 19th National Congress and retention on the CMC after the 20th National Congress in 2022.^[9][29] In this capacity, under Chairman Xi Jinping, he participated in internal deliberations shaping the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) strategic posture, drawing on his prior command of the PLA Rocket Force from 2012 to 2017, which positioned him to advise on nuclear deterrence and missile capabilities.^[20] The CMC during this period prioritized reforms to centralize command authority and integrate service branches, with Wei contributing to decisions enhancing the Rocket Force's role in broader deterrence frameworks.^[20]Key aspects of his influence involved guiding the alignment of nuclear modernization with joint operations, including advancements in silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and hypersonic technologies under CMC oversight.^[30] This included supporting theater command restructuring initiated in 2015–2016, which devolved operational control to five joint theaters while retaining CMC strategic direction, evidenced by improved force integration metrics in internal PLA assessments.^[20] Wei's input helped refine protocols for Rocket Force participation in multi-domain exercises, fostering synergies between conventional and strategic assets, though specific outcomes remained classified beyond general PLA reports of enhanced readiness.^[30]The CMC under Wei's membership endorsed policies emphasizing "active defense," as articulated in the 2019 National Defense White Paper, which detailed PLA expansions in patrol activities—such as over 1,000 South China Sea sorties annually by 2019—and nuclear stockpile growth to approximately 200 operational warheads.^[31] These decisions reflected a causal emphasis on countering perceived encirclement, prioritizing quantifiable force posture adjustments over doctrinal shifts, with Wei's Rocket Force expertise informing the paper's stress on diversified strike options.^[31]

State Councilor Position

Wei Fenghe was appointed State Councilor on March 19, 2018, concurrently with his designation as Minister of National Defense, positioning him as a key advisor to the State Council on integrating military priorities into broader governmental policy.^[9][32] In this role, he facilitated coordination between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and civilian agencies, emphasizing advisory input on defense-related fiscal and strategic matters without direct operational command over non-military domains.^[2]As State Councilor, Wei advanced China's military-civil fusion initiatives, which promote the transfer of dual-use technologies from civilian sectors to military applications.

In January 1972, he became a member of the Communist Party of China, a step that aligned with standard progression for promising PLA enlistees during the period.^[9]

Military Career

Service in the Second Artillery Corps and PLARF

Wei Fenghe enlisted in the People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, responsible for China's strategic missile forces, in 1970 at the age of 16.^[11][12] He received specialized training in rocket engineering at a missile school operated under the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, gaining foundational expertise in missile operations and maintenance.^[11] This early immersion in the Corps' technical aspects supported China's efforts to enhance its nuclear deterrent amid post-Cultural Revolution military reforms.Throughout the 1980s, Wei progressed in operational roles within missile units, culminating in his direct involvement in intercontinental ballistic missile testing in 1989, which tested the reliability and deployment capabilities of systems like the DF-5.^[13] His hands-on contributions during live-fire exercises and readiness drills underscored a focus on technical proficiency in solid-fuel propulsion technologies, as the Corps shifted toward indigenous developments such as the DF-21medium-range ballistic missile introduced in the early 1990s.

He also gave money to others to seek improper benefits, and is suspected of offering bribes.

As a high-ranking official of the Party and the military, Li betrayed the Party's original aspiration and its principles, Xinhua News Agency reported.