Ludwig wittgenstein biography philosophy

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As always before in the interpretative game, the general view sees Wittgenstein as landing on the non-skeptical side of the epistemological debate, choosing instead to peruse “hinge propositions.” These are propositions about which doubt cannot be entertained, but whether this be due to their being epistemically foundational, naturally certain, or logically unavailable to doubt is still a matter for philosophical explanation; as is the question of Wittgenstein’s object of critique – Cartesian or radical skepticism – or, in some quarters, the very assumption of his unequivocal anti-skepticism.

1936–1949Posthumous 1953Central presentation of later philosophyThe Blue and Brown Books1933–1935Posthumous 1958Student notes/dictations, transitional to later viewPhilosophical Grammar1931–1934Posthumous 1969Early transitional notebooks and typescriptsRemarks on the Foundations of Mathematics1937–1944Posthumous 1956Later reflections on mathematics and logicOn Certainty1949–1951Posthumous 1969Late notes on knowledge, doubt, and hingesZettel1930s–1940sPosthumous 1967Short remarks, thematically arrangedCulture and Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen)c.

late drafts of Philosophical Investigations, overlapping mathematical manuscripts, and varying sequences of remarks in On Certainty), which bear directly on interpretations of his philosophy.

9. One common objection is that the theory lacks clear boundaries. In 1911, following Frege’s advice that Russell was the appropriate person to study with, Wittgenstein went to Cambridge.

Sometimes termed the ‘middle Wittgenstein,’ this period heralds a rejection of dogmatic philosophy, including both traditional works and the Tractatus itself.

In the 1930s and 1940s Wittgenstein conducted seminars at Cambridge, developing most of the ideas that he intended to publish in his second book, Philosophical Investigations.

He often stresses differences between religious and scientific language-games. Philosophers who reject Wittgenstein’s perspective may believe that such an approach risks dismissing or trivializing these important aspects of human experience, relegating them to an unclear or secondary status within the framework of logical atomism.

Finally, some philosophers view logical atomism as overly rigid and overly reliant on the assumption that reality can be precisely mapped through logical analysis.

“Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain” (PI 126). When, on the contrary, it is the resistance to generalization (of any kind) that is emphasized, then the similarity in Wittgenstein’s therapeutic motivation throughout his life is much more clearly seen.

As in the previous stage, the debate here has to do with the question of ethics and its centrality in reading Wittgenstein’s oeuvre.

Hence, indeed, the requirement to define harkens back to an old dogma, which misses the playful and active character of language.

3.4 Language-games and Family Resemblance

Throughout the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein returns, again and again, to the concept of language-games to make clear his lines of thought concerning language.

This is intimately related to another of On Certainty’s themes—the primacy of the deed to the word, or, in Wittgenstein’s PI terminology, of form of life to logos. And so, the meaning of “beetle” is entirely determined by what is public. Imagine someone learning how to play chess without understanding the rules.

Critics argue that this rigidity leaves little room for uncertainty, subjectivity, or phenomena that go beyond logical explanation. During this period he worked on aeronautical engineering problems, including the design of a jet-propelled propeller.

While still oriented toward engineering, he became increasingly interested in the foundations of mathematics, especially through reading Ostwald’s Annalen der Naturphilosophie, which led him to the works of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell.

For example, in the context of a religious form of life, the phrase “God is omnipotent” might express devotion and belief. Instead, he argued, the meaning of a word differs depending on how it is used.

Form of Life

A “form of life” is the shared social and cultural practices, activities, and ways of understanding that provide the context for language use.

ludwig wittgenstein biography philosophy

Through this approach, Wittgenstein aimed to clarify how language functions and highlight its limits when it comes to expressing the nature of reality.

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This idea is demonstrated through the following example. Facts are existent states of affairs (2) and states of affairs, in turn, are combinations of objects.