Abdelilah benkirane biography of michael

Home / Political Leaders & Public Figures / Abdelilah benkirane biography of michael

On June 15, 2025, he declared Iran "the only country still confronting Israel" in defense of Palestine, justifying solidarity on religious and strategic grounds over sectarian or bilateral tensions. Counterarguments grounded in empirical patterns, however, indicate that societies maintaining traditional marriage norms exhibit lower divorce incidences; for instance, conservative models in parts of the Middle East and North Africa report rates under 10% compared to Morocco's post-reform uptick, suggesting causal links between delayed family formation and instability rather than vice versa.[77] Benkirane's framework thus posits that sharia-balanced policies foster verifiable resilience in family units, prioritizing causal realities of reproduction and upbringing over ideologically driven equality.[78]

Relations with Ethnic Minorities

Benkirane faced criticism from Amazigh activists for statements perceived as dismissive of Berber identity, including a 2013 remark describing Amazigh people as "simple folk who eat little and reproduce a lot," which the PJD was accused of using to exhibit "systematic hostility" toward the minority.[79] These comments, delivered in public speeches, fueled backlash in the 2010s, with activists interpreting them as reinforcing Arab-centric narratives within Islamist discourse and prompting protests demanding greater cultural recognition.[11] However, Benkirane maintained that such characterizations emphasized humility and communal solidarity within the Islamic ummah, rejecting ethnic separatism as a threat to national unity rather than endorsing supremacist views.[80]Despite rhetorical tensions, Benkirane's PJD-led government did not enact policies discriminating against Amazigh populations, continuing implementation of the 2011 constitution's recognition of Tamazight as an official language alongside Arabic—a provision the party had implicitly backed during the constitutional reform process preceding the November 2011 elections.[81] The administration advanced Tamazight integration in public sectors, including pilot programs for education and media under the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM), though progress was incremental and criticized by activists for insufficient funding and scope.[82] Benkirane publicly affirmed cultural pluralism, stating that Morocco's diverse identities, including Amazigh heritage, enriched the nation's Islamic framework without necessitating ethnic-based political fragmentation.[80]Claims of Arab supremacism under Benkirane's tenure lack empirical support in governance outcomes, as budget allocations for regional development in Amazigh-heavy areas like the Rif, Middle Atlas, and Sous regions followed national priorities without ethnic targeting, including infrastructure projects and social programs extended proportionally during 2012–2017.[79] For instance, the government's social housing and agricultural initiatives reached southern Amazigh provinces, contributing to modest GDP growth in underdeveloped zones, countering narratives of deliberate neglect propagated by opposition activists.[11] In May 2025, Benkirane reiterated opposition to an Amazigh-specific political party, labeling it "divisive" and arguing it undermined Morocco's cohesive identity, which again drew activist ire but aligned with his consistent emphasis on religious over ethnic solidarity.[83][80]

Foreign Policy Positions and Normalization Debates

Abdelilah Benkirane has consistently opposed Morocco's normalization with Israel under the 2020 Abraham Accords, arguing that such ties lack moral justification amid ongoing conflicts in Gaza and fail to address the Palestinian question.

abdelilah benkirane biography of michael

Benkirane predicted broader regional instability from Israel's actions, describing it as a threat not only to Palestinians but to all Arab countries, as articulated in a July 2024 address where he warned of Israel's expansionist intentions beyond Gaza.[84][85][86]This stance reflects Benkirane's prioritization of geopolitical sovereignty and causal linkages between Palestinian resolution and stable alliances, rejecting normalization despite incentives like U.S.

recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This position, reiterated in a June 22 speech predicting Israel's eventual regional irrelevance, underscores Benkirane's view of alignments driven by immediate causal threats rather than ideological purity or economic concessions from Western or Gulf partners.[89][90]Benkirane maintained balanced relations with Gulf states and Europe during his premiership, viewing Morocco's EU partnership—its primary trade bloc—as bolstered by domestic reforms for mutual stability, while resisting external pressures that could compromise national autonomy.

Read more on Wikipedia

His biography is available in 37 different languages on Wikipedia (up from 35 in 2024). He has drawn contrasts with Western societies, asserting that unchecked adoption of liberal concepts has "annihilated" the family there, leading to societal fragmentation—a view he extends to warn against similar secular drifts in Morocco that could precipitate moral and social erosion observed in peer contexts.[62][63]On cultural matters, Benkirane advocates a gradual reinforcement of Islamic values through non-coercive means, such as curriculum reforms in education and promotion of moral discourse in media, aligning with the monarchy's directives rather than revolutionary impositions like hudud corporal punishments, which the PJD has not pursued in its platform.

However, he has in the past described secularism as "a dangerous concept for Morocco", and in 2010 he campaigned, unsuccessfully, to ban a performance in Rabat by Elton John because it "promoted homosexuality".

His new government has targeted average economic growth of 5.5 percent a year during its four year mandate, and to reduce the jobless rate to 8 percent by the end of 2016 from 9.1 percent at the start of 2012.

Career

Having won a plurality of seats in the November 2011 parliamentary election, his party formed a coalition with three parties that had been part of previous governments, and he was appointed as Prime Minister on 29 November 2011.

During the 1970s, Benkirane was a leftist political activist. After him are Conrad I, Duke of Bavaria, Theodora of Khazaria, Grace Coolidge, Agnes of Babenberg, Wala of Corbie, and Titus Manlius Torquatus.

Most Popular Politicians in Wikipedia

Go to all Rankings

  • Emma Darwin

    1808 - 1896

    HPI: 60.69

    Rank: 10,618

  • Rudrama Devi

    1259 - 1289

    HPI: 60.69

    Rank: 10,619

  • Louis, Prince of Hesse and by Rhine

    1908 - 1968

    HPI: 60.69

    Rank: 10,620

  • Pygmalion of Tyre

    HPI: 60.69

    Rank: 10,621

  • Jovenel Moïse

    1968 - 2021

    HPI: 60.69

    Rank: 10,622

  • Andrei Bubnov

    1883 - 1938

    HPI: 60.68

    Rank: 10,623

  • Abdelilah Benkirane

    1954 - Present

    HPI: 60.68

    Rank: 10,624

  • Conrad I, Duke of Bavaria

    1020 - 1055

    HPI: 60.68

    Rank: 10,625

  • Theodora of Khazaria

    700 - 800

    HPI: 60.68

    Rank: 10,626

  • Grace Coolidge

    1879 - 1957

    HPI: 60.68

    Rank: 10,627

  • Agnes of Babenberg

    1111 - 1163

    HPI: 60.68

    Rank: 10,628

  • Wala of Corbie

    772 - 836

    HPI: 60.68

    Rank: 10,629

  • Titus Manlius Torquatus

    290 BC - 202 BC

    HPI: 60.68

    Rank: 10,630

Contemporaries

Among people born in 1954, Abdelilah Benkirane ranks 178.

After having won a plurality of seats in the 2011 parliamentary election, his party, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party formed a coalition with three parties that had been part of previous governments. He advocated pragmatic engagement with these actors but subordinated economic incentives to sovereignty, as evidenced by his opposition to normalization despite potential Gulf-aligned benefits, framing foreign policy as rooted in self-preservation against hegemonic imbalances.[91]

Post-Premiership Role

PJD Leadership Continuation

Following his ouster as Prime Minister in March 2017, Abdelilah Benkirane did not retain the PJD's secretary-general position, which passed to Saadeddine Othmani in December 2017 after the party opted against allowing Benkirane a third term amid internal debates over his populist style.[92][22] Benkirane nonetheless preserved substantial sway within the party through his longstanding role as a charismatic figurehead, leveraging his reputation for anti-corruption advocacy to critique elite entrenchment and governmental gridlock.[93][23]The PJD faced severe electoral reversal in the September 8, 2021, legislative elections, plummeting from 125 seats in the 395-member parliament (won in 2016) to 13 seats, amid low turnout of around 50% and gains by palace-aligned liberal parties.[94] Othmani resigned in the aftermath, paving the way for Benkirane's return as secretary-general on October 30, 2021, where he garnered 1,112 votes (89%) from 1,250 delegates, signaling robust internal backing despite the national rout.[95][96] In assuming responsibility, Benkirane declared "we are all responsible" for the loss, framing it as a collective shortfall in addressing voter disillusionment rather than isolated leadership errors.[97]

Abdelilah Benkirane

POLITICIAN

1954 - Today

Abdelilah Benkirane

Abdelilah Benkirane (Arabic: عبد الإله بنكيران, romanized: ʻAbd al-Ilāh Binkīrān) is a Moroccan politician who served as Prime Minister of Morocco from 2011 to 2017.

After him are Larry Wall, Tallis Obed Moses, Derek Warwick, Don Wilson, Patricia McPherson, and Scott Bakula.

Others Born in 1954

Go to all Rankings

In Morocco

Among people born in Morocco, Abdelilah Benkirane ranks 66 out of 264. Benkirane's government has also actively pursued Morocco's ties with the European Union, its chief trade partner, as well as becoming increasingly engaged with the six-member Gulf Co-operation Council.

Works

Politics

economic and legal issues at the core of its platform and is committed to internal democracy

Views

Quotations: If I get into government, it won't be so I can tell young women how many centimeters of skirt they should wear to cover their legs.

After him are Macha Méril (1940), Baba Sali (1889), Saadeddine Othmani (1956), Ahmed Aboutaleb (1961), Yazid of Morocco (1750), and Ibrahim ibn Tashfin (1131).

Others born in Morocco

Go to all Rankings

Among POLITICIANS In Morocco

Among politicians born in Morocco, Abdelilah Benkirane ranks 36.

That's none of my business. The PJD captured 107 seats, securing a plurality of approximately 27% amid low voter turnout of 45.4%, outperforming secular rivals like the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), which took 47 seats; this outcome reflected public frustration with the establishment parties' track record on reforms.[26][27]King Mohammed VI formally appointed Benkirane as prime minister on November 29, 2011, fulfilling the new constitutional provision and installing Morocco's first Islamist-led executive, a pragmatic concession to electoral results that balanced demands for change with monarchical oversight.[3][28] Benkirane's straightforward campaign style and commitments to combat corruption—perceived as rampant, with Morocco ranking 88th out of 178 on the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index—alongside high youth unemployment rates hovering around 30% and persistent rural-urban inequality, garnered broad initial support as a potential corrective to pre-election socioeconomic inertia.[29]

Premiership (2011-2017)

Coalition Formation and Initial Policies

Following the Justice and Development Party's (PJD) victory in the November 25, 2011, parliamentary elections, where it secured 107 of 395 seats, King Mohammed VI appointed Benkirane as prime minister on November 29, 2011.[15] Negotiations to form a coalition government lasted approximately six weeks amid challenges in allocating ministerial portfolios and balancing ideological differences, culminating in the announcement of a 30-member cabinet on January 10, 2012, which included PJD loyalists alongside partners from the conservative-nationalist Istiqlal Party (60 seats) and independents or technocrats to ensure broader representation and monarchical approval.[30] This pragmatic inclusion of non-Islamist elements, such as Istiqlal's Abbas El Fassi as a senior minister, reflected compromises necessitated by Morocco's constitutional framework, where the king retains veto power over key appointments and foreign policy, limiting PJD's dominance despite its electoral lead.[31]The coalition's early agenda emphasized fiscal stabilization and social mitigation in response to the economic grievances fueling the 2011 February 20 Movement protests, which had demanded reforms amid rising food and fuel prices.[23] Benkirane's government prioritized subsidy reforms targeting the compensation fund, which had ballooned to 57 billion dirhams (about $6.6 billion, or 6.6% of GDP) in 2012 due to global commodity spikes, by shifting from universal price controls to targeted cash transfers for low-income households via bank and postal accounts.[32][33] This approach aimed to reduce fiscal strain—subsidies had reached 15% of public spending—while directing aid to the vulnerable, with Benkirane publicly urging needy citizens to register for direct payments starting in June 2012.[34]Benkirane cultivated a distinct public image as an accessible, populist leader, contrasting with the technocratic style of prior governments, through frequent media engagements where he employed colloquial Darija dialect and direct appeals to ordinary Moroccans.[23] These appearances, including televised addresses on economic hardships, helped project transparency and responsiveness within the coalition's constrained mandate, though they operated under the monarchy's overarching authority.[30]

Key Governance Initiatives

Benkirane's government launched a national anti-corruption strategy in 2013, emphasizing transparency and accountability through institutional reforms and public campaigns against bribery.[35] This included the establishment of the National Commission for Integrity and Anti-Corruption, which replaced prior bodies focused on prevention, and targeted high-profile sectors like agriculture implicated in scandals.[36] These efforts, coupled with pension system adjustments to address fiscal imbalances, contributed to sustained public approval ratings of 60-70% from 2013 to 2015, as polls indicated widespread satisfaction with the focus on curbing graft despite economic pressures.[37][38]Economically, the administration set a target of 5.5% annual GDP growth for 2012-2016, pursued through infrastructure investments—rising from $18 billion in 2013 to $19 billion by 2016—and tradeliberalization measures to enhance export competitiveness.[39][40] These initiatives partially achieved the goals amid global slowdowns, with public spending prioritized on projects like port expansions and renewable energy to stabilize growth and reduce unemployment toward an 8% rate.[41]Social policies under Benkirane advanced access to housing via expanded urban development programs and education through increased enrollment drives, building on prior national human development initiatives.[42] Poverty metrics improved notably, with the national headcount ratio falling to 4.8% by 2013 from higher baselines around 6-9% in 2011, and multidimensional poverty halving between 2011 and 2017 per official assessments.[43][44]

Political Challenges and Ouster

Following the October 7, 2016, parliamentary elections, in which the Justice and Development Party (PJD) under Benkirane secured 125 seats—the largest bloc but short of a majority—efforts to form a coalition government stalled amid protracted negotiations lasting over five months.[45] Key obstacles included reluctance from secular and royalist parties, such as the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) and Istiqlal, to ally with the Islamist PJD, driven by ideological differences and strategic maneuvering to dilute PJD influence on sensitive portfolios like interior, justice, and foreign affairs.[46] Benkirane's insistence on excluding PAM, citing its opposition tactics during his first term, further narrowed viable partners, exacerbating gridlock despite consultations with over a dozen formations.[47]On March 15, 2017, King Mohammed VI invoked Article 47 of the 2011 Constitution, which permits the monarch to relieve the prime ministerial designate of duties if unable to form a government within a reasonable period, thereby ousting Benkirane after his repeated declarations of negotiation fatigue.[11] The king subsequently appointed Saadeddine Othmani, a fellow PJD member and former foreign minister, as the new head of government on March 17, 2017, tasking him with resuming talks that succeeded in forming a coalition within weeks, including previously resistant parties.[48] This intervention highlighted the monarchy's constitutional prerogative to override parliamentary delays, reflecting structural limits on elected executives in Morocco's hybrid system where royal authority supersedes in resolving impasses.[49]Interpersonal and institutional frictions compounded the deadlock, as Benkirane's assertive style clashed with palace preferences for compliant leadership, evident in prior vetoes on cabinet picks and policy initiatives that encroached on monarchical domains like security and economic steering.[50] Analyses point to the palace's orchestration of party hesitancy to curb PJD autonomy, framing Benkirane's removal as a recalibration to prevent Islamist encroachment on elite-controlled levers rather than mere procedural failure.[51]Despite the ouster, Benkirane retained strong grassroots support within PJD ranks and beyond, bolstered by perceptions of his tenacity against entrenched interests, as demonstrated by his 2021 re-election as party secretary-general amid calls for his return.[52] This enduring appeal underscored causal dynamics of resistance to PJD-led reforms, positioning the episode as elite pushback against perceived threats to status quo power distribution over Benkirane's governance shortcomings.[53]

Ideology and Policy Positions

Core Islamist Framework

Benkirane's ideological foundation lies in political Islam, which he and the Justice and Development Party (PJD) position as a corrective to the perceived shortcomings of secular authoritarianism in Morocco, including endemic corruption and moral erosion following independence.

As PJD leader, he elevated transparency and accountability in campaign platforms, launching a nationalanti-corruption strategy in 2015 to institutionalize prevention mechanisms across public sectors.[23][35] Benkirane's initiatives sought to dismantle crony networks through enhanced oversight, positioning corruption eradication as prerequisite for redistributing economic opportunities to marginalized groups rather than relying solely on welfare expansion.[23]

Social and Cultural Views

Benkirane has consistently defended the traditional family unit as the foundational element of Moroccan society, emphasizing the preservation of roles such as male guardianship and critiquing proposed reforms to the Moudawana (Family Code) that he argues undermine masculinity and familial stability.

This stance balances PJD's Islamist roots with Morocco's pluralistic traditions, avoiding challenges to the dynastic system in favor of pragmatic coexistence.[3][23][66]

Controversies and Criticisms

Statements on Women's Roles and Family

In July 2025, Abdelilah Benkirane, secretary-general of Morocco's Justice and Development Party (PJD), stated during a public speech that young women should prioritize marriage over higher education, arguing that prolonged studies often lead to spinsterhood and personal hardship, which he described as a "crime against women."[67][68] He contended that education alone provides limited fulfillment without family formation, citing rising rates of unmarried women in Morocco—estimated at over 1.2 million aged 30-49 in recent demographic surveys—as evidence of risks from delayed marriage.[69][70] Benkirane defended these remarks against backlash, emphasizing that traditional marriage timing aligns with biological and social imperatives for family stability, rather than abstract equality ideals.[71]Benkirane has historically advocated reforms to Morocco's Moudawana family code that integrate Sharia principles with protections for women, including support for the 2004 revisions that raised the minimum marriage age to 18 and required judicial approval for polygamy to prevent abuse.[72] However, he has opposed further liberalization, such as outright bans on polygamy without reciprocal male responsibilities or mandates for spousal consent in property sharing, arguing these undermine complementary gender roles essential to family cohesion.[73][74] In January 2025, he criticized proposed amendments for eroding "masculinity" and ignoring pressing issues like escalating divorce rates—reported at 25% of marriages in urban Morocco—and declining fertility below replacement levels, which he linked to imbalanced reforms favoring individualism over mutual duties.[62]Feminist groups and women's rights advocates, including former minister Yasmina Baddou, condemned Benkirane's positions as regressive, claiming they perpetuate patriarchal control and discourage female empowerment through education and autonomy.[75][76] These critiques often emanate from advocacy networks aligned with progressive NGOs, which prioritize gender parity metrics over longitudinal family outcomes.

Abdelilah Benkirane

Abdelilah Benkirane is a Moroccan politician. After him are Saadeddine Othmani (1956), Ahmed Aboutaleb (1961), Yazid of Morocco (1750), Ibrahim ibn Tashfin (1131), Yahya al-Mu'tasim (null), and Idris II of Morocco (791).

Moroccan born Politicians

Go to all Rankings

.

Before him are Amir Peretz (1952), Driss Jettou (1945), Abu Yusuf Yaqub ibn Abd al-Haqq (1212), Mohammed Ben Aarafa (1886), Abderrahmane Youssoufi (1924), and Abdellatif Filali (1928).

He was elected to the House of Representatives on November 14, 1997, representing Salé as one of the initial cohort of Islamist parliamentarians; the party's precursor, participating under the banner of the Reform and Renewal Movement, secured eight seats in that election, marking a tentative mainstreaming of moderate Islamist voices amid Morocco's controlled multiparty system.[15][21]Within the Justice and Development Party (PJD), formalized in 1998 as the successor to these efforts, Benkirane ascended through internal structures, becoming president of the party's national council in 2004, a role that positioned him as a key organizer and ideologue focused on pragmatic engagement with the constitutional monarchy.[1] His tenure emphasized the PJD's commitment to moderation, distancing from radicalism by pledging loyalty to the king and advocating gradual reforms within existing institutions, which helped legitimize the party among wary elites and voters seeking ethical alternatives to entrenched corruption.[3]In July 2008, Benkirane was elected PJD secretary-general, defeating incumbent Saadeddine Othmani in internal party elections and assuming leadership of its pro-monarchy, centrist-leaning faction.[3][22] Under his guidance, the party prioritized anti-corruption rhetoric and economic populism, framing itself as a bulwark against elite malfeasance while avoiding confrontational Islamism that could provoke royal intervention.